). Differently biased coins will generate different lotteries. In general, suppose for a risk alternative the set of possible outcomes is known and finite. Such a risk/alternative can be described as a lottery denoted by a probability tuple/vector whose components are the probabilities. For instance, Let, s denote a state of nature or a possible outcome of a risky alternative. Let Ω denote the set of possible outcomes. Ω is assumed to be non-empty. When there are S possible outcomes, we have Ω = {s 1 , s 2 , ..., s S }. For the experiment involving tossing of a coin Ω = {s 1 , s 2 } = {H, T }.
A 'Simple Lottery', L, is a vector (p 1 , ..., p S ), where p s is the probability of the occurrence of outcome s. Moreover, p s ≥ 0 and s (p s ) = 1. For given set of possible outcomes, Ω = {s 1 , s 2 , ..., s S }, let L denote the set of simple lotteries, i.e., L = (p 1 , p 2 , ..., p S )| p i ≥ 0 and
For example, for a risky alternative of there are only three possible outcomes, s 1 , s 2 , and s 3 , we have Ω = {s 1 , s 2 , s 3 }. A general lottery L ∈ L is a vector (p 1 , p 2 , p 3 ) such that p i ≥ 0 and p 1 + p 2 + p 3 = 1. Some of the specific simple lotteries are; L 1 = (1, 0, 0), L 2 = (0, 1, 0), L 3 = (0, 0, 1), L 4 = ( ). Note that Ω = {s 1 , s 2 , s 3 }, i.e., a three-component lottery can be represented as a point in equilateral triangle whose altitude is 1. In general, when Ω = {s 1 , s 2 , ..., s S }, a simple lottery will have have S components. A S component simple lottery can be represented geometrically as a point in S − 1 dimensional simplex. A complete description of an experiment or a lottery requires probability assignment not only to each of the possible outcomes but also various possible combinations of the possible outcomes. Formally, the complete description requires working with what is called a probability space. To illustrate, consider the experiment of tossing of a coin. For the experiment we have Ω = {H, T }. Let ϑ = {φ, {H}, {T }, {H, T }}, i.e., ϑ is the set of subsets of Ω. In another context, a subset of Ω is called an event. Consider the function: µ : ϑ → [0, 1], such that:
That is, µ assign a probability to each subset of Ω. Further, µ assign a probability 1 to the entire set of outcomes, i.e., Ω. The function µ is called a measure of (objective) probability over the elements of ϑ. In the context of tossing of a fair coin, µ will assign probabilities as follows:µ(φ) = 0, µ({H}) = 1 2 = µ({T }), and µ({H, T }) = 1.
We call the tuple (Ω, ϑ, µ) to be a probability space. For a biased coin, the probability of different subsets of Ω will differ from the corresponding probabilities for a fair coin. Technically speaking, the functions µ will differ in the two cases. This means that the probability space associated with tossing of a biased coin will be different from the one corresponding to a fair coin.
Consider another experiment involving casting of unbiased dice. Here you can easily see that Ω = {s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , s 4 , s 5 , s 6 }, ϑ = {φ, {s 1 }, {s 2 }, ..., {s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , s 4 , s 5 , s 6 }}. The probability measure µ : ϑ → [0, 1] will be such that:
, etc. This experiment has the probability space, (Ω, ϑ, µ), associated with it, where Ω, ϑ, and µ are as described here.
To sum up, different probability spaces will differ either in terms of Ω or ϑ, or µ, or all three. For more on probability space, read the following optional subsection.
Probability Spaces * All starred section/subsections are optional readings. A probability space is defined by the tuple (Ω, ϑ, µ). The tuple represents the space of the possible outcomes or, alternatively put, the space of the possible states of nature pertaining to an experiment. Here, ϑ is a collection of subsets of Ω. Sets in ϑ are called events. When the set Ω is finite, ϑ is taken to be simply a set of all subsets of Ω. Otherwise, ϑ is σ−algebra of subsets of Ω. That is, the set ϑ is closed under complementation and countable unions of its member sets. Formally, ϑ satisfies the following properties: Ω ∈ ϑ; and A ∈ ϑ ⇒ A ∈ ϑ. Moreover, A n ∈ ϑ, n ≥ 1 ⇒ ∞ n=1 A n ∈ ϑ. When ϑ is σ− algebra, you prove that it also satisfies the following properties: ∅ ∈ ϑ, A, B ∈ ϑ ⇒ A ∩ B ∈ ϑ; and A, B ∈ ϑ ⇒ A − B ∈ ϑ; and
The last component of the above tuple is µ, which is a measure of (objective) probability over the elements of ϑ. Formally put, µ is a function from ϑ to the real numbers that assigns to each event a probability between 0 and 1: µ : ϑ → [0, 1]; (∀A ∈ ϑ)[0 ≤ µ(A) ≤ 1], and µ(Ω) = 1.
Types of Lotteries
So far we have defined what can be called 'simple lotteries'. The following example lists five simple lotteries.
Example 1 Assume there are three possible outcomes, i.e., Ω = 3. Some of possible simple lotteries are:
As should be clear by now, a simple lottery is a probability distribution over outcomes listed in the set Ω. If you play a simple lottery you will end up with one of the outcomes listed in Ω. That is, outcome of a simple lottery is some certain outcome or the state of nature. In several contexts, the outcome of a lottery can be another lottery, i.e, the outcomes of a lotteries can be risk alternatives. Such lotteries are called 'compound lotteries'. The following examples list two such lotteries.
Example 2 Assume there are three possible outcomes, i.e., Ω = 3. Consider a lottery L whose outcomes are simple lotteries L 1 = (1, 0, 0), L 2 = (0, 1, 0), L 3 = (0, 0, 1), with probability 1/2, 1/4 and 1/4, respectively. In that case, a compound lottery L can be described as L ≡ (L 1 , L 2 , L 3 ; 1/2, 1/4, 1/4). The compound lottery L will give you lottery L 1 with probability 1/2, and so on. In general, a compound lottery is denoted by (L 1 , ..., L K ; α 1 , ..., α K ), where L k ∈ L, k = 1, ..., K, are lotteries, and α 1 , ..., α K are such that α k ≥ 0 and k α k = 1. The lottery (L 1 , ..., L K ; α 1 , ..., α K ) yields lottery L k with probability α k , and so on.
Corresponding to every compound lottery there is what is called 'reduced form lottery. To illustrate, take any compound lottery, say ( 
For the compound lottery in Example (2), K = 3 and it can easily be checked that
) is the reduced form lottery associated with the compound lottery (L 1 , L 2 , L 3 ; 1/2, 1/4, 1/4). It should be noted that two different compound lotteries may yield the same reduced form lottery. For example, the compound lotteries in Examples (2) and (3) both have same reduced form, which is ( ). This means that o, there is a loss of information in moving to the reduced form of a compound lottery.
Preferences over Lotteries
It is standard to assume that while choosing among the compound lotteries, the decision maker considers only the relevant reduced form lotteries, e.g., a decision maker will be indifferent between compound lotteries defined in Examples (2) and (3) above. Further, the decision maker has a preference relation defined over the set of lotteries, L.
When is a complete pre-ordering (complete and transitive) and continuous, 1 from Debreu (1966) we know that can be represented by a utility function, say U , such that
Note that the function U is defined up to a monotonically increasing transformation. That is, if take another function, sayŨ , that is a monotonic transformation of U , thenŨ will also represent the same preference relation .
That is, if a utility function U (.) has an expected utility form then there will exist real numbers u 1 , ..., u S , such that utility of any lottery, (p 1 , ..., p S ) can be described as expected value of u 1 , ..., u S with weight being the respective probabilities, p 1 , ..., p S . Let U (.) : L → R be a v.N-M expected utility function. Note that U (1, 0, ..., 0) = u 1 , ... , U (0, 0, ..., 1) = u S , etc. Moreover, the value of U (.) is the expected value of u 1 , ..., u S , i.e., U (.) is linear in p 1 , ..., p S .
The Independence Axiom implies that when L L the ranking αL
Now, we are ready to state what is called The Expected Utility Theorem. 2 (EUT).
Proposition 1 The Expected Utility Theorem: Suppose the preference relation defined on L is rational, continuous and satisfies the independence axiom, then can be represented by a utility function that has an expected utility form. We will assume that for the decision maker, the Expected Utility Theorem holds, i.e., s/he has preference relation that is defined on L and is rational, continuous and satisfies the independence axiom. This means that there exist non-negative real numbers u 1 , ..., u S such that for any
Next, let us consider some other interesting features of a preferences for which the Expected Utility Theorem holds. Consider L 4 , L 5 , α 4 and α 5 as defined in Example 3. In view of the above, you can check that
. Therefore, when EUT holds, the utility function is linear in lotteries. In fact, we can make the following claim.
, affine combination of lotteries is preserved.
However, the expected utility form is a cardinal property.
on L iff there exist β > 0 and γ ∈ R such that U (.) = βU (.) + γ. That is, only affine transformation is preserved.
Exercises *
Here are some optional exercises for you. Exercise 1: Suppose the preference relation satisfies the Independence Axiom. Prove that:
Exercise 2: Suppose the preference relation defined on L is representable by a utility function that has an expected utility form. Show that is continuous and satisfies the independence axiom.
Hint
Exercise 3: Suppose the preference relation defined on L is representable by a utility function that has an expected utility form. Show that the indifference curves are the straight lines parallel to each other.
Money Lotteries
As discussed earlier, complete description of lotteries requires specification of the underlying probability space. Take a probability space (Ω, ϑ, µ). Generally, the outcomes listed in the set Ω are not quantities of money. A money lottery is different from a general lottery in that under a money lottery the final outcome can be described in term of money. Alternatively, money lottery can be though of a general lottery with additional qualification that each of the outcome in the set Ω has monetary consequence.
To illustrate, consider a probability space for the experiment of casting a fair dice, (Ω, ϑ, µ). Here, Ω = {s 1 , ..., s 6 }. Now consider a set R = {x 1 , ..., x 6 }, where x i the monetary consequence related with the state s i , for i = 1, .., 6. Specifically, we can let {x 1 , ..., x 6 } = {0, 10, 100, 50, 20, 200}. We can read this scenario as follows: if the dice land with side s i on the top, you win x i amount of money. Since dice is fair, we have µ(s i ) = 1 6 , for i = 1, .., 6.
We can formally define this money lottery in terms of the probability space (Ω, ϑ, µ) and a random variable a, where a is function with following properties: a : Ω → R, a(s i ) = x i . We interpret x ∈ R as wealth.
For the above experiment of casting a fair dice, the random variable a can also be described as the vector (0, 10, 100, 50, 20, 200) . In this context, what is the probability of winning at most 50? Note that you win an amount less than or equal to 50, if the dice lands up with any of the followings sides; s 1 , s 2 , s 4 , s 5 . Therefore, probability of winning at most 50 is probability of the event {s 1 , s 2 , s 4 , s 5 }. This probability is given by µ[s 1 , s 2 , s 4 , s 5 ] = 4/6. Let ζ be set of subsets of X, and a −1 be a function such that:
Note that a −1 is NOT inverse function of a defined above. Recall, elements of ζ are subsets of X. So, if we take a subset of X, a −1 function gives its pre-image which belongs to ϑ. For example, a −1 (0, 10, 50, 20) = {s 1 , s 2 , s 4 , s 5 }. Now consider the following function
, where µ the above defined probability measure on Ω, and a −1 is the above defined function.
a −1 (−∞, x] is the set of outcomes whose monetary consequences are less than or equal to x. For example, in the above context a −1 (−∞, 50] = {s 1 , s 2 , s 4 , s 5 }. Therefore, F (50) = . It is obvious that F is the distribution function associated with this money lottery. It turns out that, we can study the above money lottery with the help of the random variable a along with the distribution function F (.).
For the above probability space, (Ω, ϑ, µ), consider another functionâ : Ω → R, a(s i ) = x i . Let the set of monetary consequences be {x 1 , ..., x 6 } = {20, 10, 100, 50, 40, 45}. Forâ, let the corresponding distribution function beF (.) : R → [0, 1], e.g., letF (50) = µ[s 1 , s 2 , s 4 , s 5 , s 6 ] = 5 6 , F (100) = µ[s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , s 4 , s 5 , s 6 ] = 1. Again, we can represent this random variableâ as the vector (0, 10, 100, 50, 20, 200) . Moreover, we can study this second lottery with the help of this random variable along with the distribution functionF (.).
When Ω is finite, we can denote the act by the vector (x 1 , ..., x S ), where S is the number of states in Ω and x s is the monetary payoff in state s. F (x) = {s:a(s)≤x} p s , p s = µ(s).
Note that for a given probability space, different random variables will generate different distribution functions, i.e., different lotteries. Also, different probability spaces will generate different lotteries. Different probability spaces will generate different money lotteries and different distribution functions.
To sum up, we can represent and analyze a money lottery simply by studying the associated distribution function F (.) : R → [0, 1]. Let L be the set of all money lotteries, i.e., the set of all probability distribution functions defined over say [x 0 , ∞), where x 0 ∈ R.
Take any lottery represented by the distribution function F (.). For this lottery, the probability that the realized monetary payoff is less than or equal to x is given by F (x). Note that distribution functions preserve the linearity of lotteries. The final distribution of the compound lottery (F 1 (x) , ..., F K (x); α 1 , ..., α K ) is the weighted average of the individual distributions, i.e.,
As before, we assume that the decision maker has a rational preference relation defined over L. As an implication of the Expected Utility Theorem, it follows that when satisfies the Axioms of continuity and independence, there exist a function u :
Remark: Notice that so far we have not imposed any conditions on u. However, here for simplicity and to avoid some paradoxes, we will assume that u is continuous, increasing and bounded above. (St. Petersburg-Menger paradox). When u is continuous and bounded above, we can be sure of the existence of the above integral. 3 Moreover, there exists a function, f (x), such that:
3 It called Riemann-Stieltjes integral.
Since,
U (.) is linear in F (.). We will call the function u as Bernoulli utility function.
Money Lottery: General description * This subsection is optional. For a given probability space, a general lottery can be defined as an act or a gamble or a random variable a, where the random variable a is a function that maps Ω into C, i.e., a : Ω → C, where C is the set of consequences. Formally, for a given probability space, (Ω, ϑ, µ), Let A be the set of all acts or gambles. Let ζ be the Borelian algebra on R. In this set-up it can be shown that each act induces a probability measure p on (R, ζ), such that
In other words, each act induces a lottery describable by the distribution function
Let's assume that x is continuous. When µ • a −1 is continuous with respect to the Lebesgues measure λ, from Radon-Nikodym theorem it follows that µ • a −1 , i.e., F (x) has a density function w.r.t. λ such that F (x) = 
Risk and Premia
We begin by defining what are called degenerate lotteries. A lottery represented by F (.) is called Degenerate Lottery if for x ∈ R, we have have (∀x < x)[F (x ) = 0] and (∀x ) ≥ x[F (x ) = 1)]. In that case, the lottery gives amount x with probability 1. You can verify that a lottery is degenerate if the following holds: µ • a −1 ([x 0 , x) = 1 for some x ∈ R. A degenerate lottery is risk free lottery.
Here are some examples: Let a(s i ) = x i . Now, the lottery (1, 0) over Ω = {s 1 , s 2 } is a degenerate lottery -it produces outcome s 1 with probability 1. The lottery (1, 0, 0) over Ω = {s 1 , s 2 , s 3 } is also a degenerate lottery. The money lottery ( 3 ) overΩ = {s 1 , s 2 , s 3 } such that a(s i ) = 100 is also a degenerate money lottery -the gives amount 100 with probability 1. A lottery that does not produce an outcome with probability 1 is called non-degenerate.
Take a lottery F (.) ∈ L. The expected monetary value of (return from) this lottery is p i x i , if x takes only finite values. When if x is a continuous variable the expected monetary value of the lottery is xdF (x). Let, F d (.) be a (degenerate) lottery that yields xdF (x) with probability 1. We call F d (.) the degenerate lottery associated with lottery F (.).
Risk Aversion: Consider a non-degenerate lottery F (.), let F d (.) be the associated degenerate lottery. A decision maker with preference relation is risk averse for the lottery
Definition 4 A decision maker with preference relation is risk averse if
where F (.) is non-degenerate. He is called strictly risk
Definition 5 Strict Risk Aversion: A decision maker with is strictly risk averse if for every non-degenerate lottery ∀F (.), we have
By definition, if u exhibits (strict) risk aversion then u is (strictly) concave. (Jensen's inequality). Also, you should note that attitude towards risk is a feature of the underlying preference relation. However, when EUT holds that is the preference relation can be represented by utility function then we can study the attitude towards risk simply by examining the properties of relevant vN-M function u.
Definition 6 Risk Neutrality: A decision maker with is risk
Next we define Certainty Equivalent of a lottery. For given u and the initial wealth level x, the certainty equivalent of the lottery F (z), c(F, u,x), is given by
It is easy to show that (∀F (.) ∈ L)[c(F, u,x) ≤ zdF (z)] iff u exhibits risk aversion, i.e., iff u is concave. To see this note that c(F, u,
Proposition 4 The following statements are equivalent: u is concave; u exhibits risk-aversion;
For given wealth levelx, let's add riskz with distribution F (z). The Risk Premium, ρ(x,z), is given by
That is, at the wealth levelx, the decision maker is indifferent b/w bearing the riskz and having a sure amount of zdF (z) − ρ(x,z). From (1) and (2),
Note that when u exhibits risk-aversion, i.e., (
Also, note that if a decision maker who is at wealth levelx and has riskz, s/he will be willing to sell it at a price of c (F, u,x) . Therefore, c(F, u,x) = c a (F, u,x) is the (asking) price of the riskz, from the perspective of the decision maker who owns the risk. On the other hand, if s/he does not own the riskz but is thinking of buying it, at the wealth level x the maximum amount s/he will be willing to pay to buy the riskz is given by
Insurance Premium: For given wealth levelx, the insurance premium, c I (F, u,x) is the amount that makes the decision maker indifferent b/w accepting the riskz and a payment of c I (F, u,x). let's add riskz with distribution F (z). c I (F, u,x) is given by
From (1)- (4), we get the following relations
Clearly, when the risk is actuarially fair, i.e., when zdF (z) = 0, c I (F, u,x) = −c(F, u,x) = ρ(x,z). Since, for a risk-averse person ρ(x,z) ≥ 0, the decision maker will pay a non-negative amount to get rid of the risk. For additional properties of risk premium, see the Appendix.
4 Risk Aversion: Measurements and comparisons
Coefficient of Absolute Risk Aversion
As one would expect, risk aversion is related to the curvature of u, i.e., the magnitude of u but cannot be fully captured by it. Why?. Suppose, v(.) = βu(.) + γ, where β > 0, then u(.) and v(.) represent the same preference relations, so a satisfactory measure of risk aversion should give us the same answer for these two functions. However, whenever β = 1, v (.) = u (.) therefore we get different answers. Coefficient of Absolute Risk Aversion CARA: Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion at wealth levelx ∈ R is given by
Obviously, r A is defined only when u (x) = 0; u (x) = 0 implies risk neutrality. However, you can see that for any v(x) = βu(x) + γ, where β > 0, we have r A (x, v) = r A (x, u). That is, unlike u , r A (x, u) is invariant to linear transformation of the utility function. Moreover, from r A (x, u) we can recover u up to two constants of integration. But any Bernoulli utility function is unique only up to two constants; the origin and scale. This means that we can recover the preference relation fully. For example, let r A (x, u) = − u (x) u (x) = t, t > 0. Integrating, r A (x, u) gives us u(x) = −βe −tx + γ for some β > 0. But, −βe −tx + γ represents the same preference relation, regardless of β > 0 and γ. As a special case, we get u(x) = −e −tx . In general, we can write
If u(x) andū(x) represent the same preference relation, we write u(x) ∼ū(x). We know that ρ(x,z) = 1 2 σ 2 z r A (x, u), i.e.,
That is, r A (x, u) is proportional to ρ(x,z) and, therefore, is a measure of the local risk aversion. Similarly, −r A (x, u) is a measure of the local propensity to gamble.
Note that while r A (x, u) is a measure of small risk aversion, ρ(x,z) is a better measure when the risk is not small.
Comparing Risk Aversion Across Individuals
Consider u i = −e −c i x , for individual i = 1, 2. Remember this function exhibits CARA preference. For this functional form, it is easy to see that ∀x[r A (x, u 2 ) ≥ r A (x, u 1 )] ⇔ c 2 ≥ c 1 . In general, we have the following result.
Proposition 5 Take two BU F s u 1 (.) and u 2 (.). The individual with u 2 (.) is more risk averse than the individual with u 1 (.) if any of the following holds:
(ii) There exists an increasing and concave function ψ(.) such that
For proof see Appendix.
Comparing Risk Aversion across Wealth Levels
A decision maker whose preference is represented by u is said to exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion with wealth if
Consider a BUF, u, and two different wealth levels say x 1 and x 2 , x 1 > x 2 . For any riskz with distribution F (z), we can study the decision maker's choice behavior by considering functions u 1 (z) = u(x 1 +z) and u 2 (z) = u(x 2 +z). It is intuitive that if u exhibits decreasing absolute risk aversion than r A (z, u 2 ) ≥ r A (z, u 1 ).
Proposition 6 A BUF, u, exhibits decreasing absolute risk aversion iff any of the following holds: (i) x 1 > x 2 implies that u 2 (z) is more concave than u 1 (z), i.e., u 2 (z) is a concave transformation of u 1 (z); (ii) x − c(F, u, x) is a decreasing function of x;
Coefficient of Relative Risk Aversion
Suppose we consider values of the riskz relative to the wealth level. Then, we can say that the riskz is proportional, in that an arbitrary realization of the risk can be described as zx, where z ∈ [0, 1] say. For a given BUF, u, at wealth levelx, the Coefficient of Relative Risk Aversion is
Clearly, r R (u,x) =xr A (u,x). For example, the function u(x) = log x exhibits constant relative risk aversion. You can verify that for u(x) = log x, we have r R (u, x) = 1. More generally, for u(x) ∼ log x, r R (u, x) = 1. Also, for u(x) ∼ x 1−c , where c < 1, r R (u, x) = c, and for u(x) ∼ −x (1+c) , where c > 1, r R (u, x) = −c. The relative risk premiumρ(x,z) is given by
Remark: A decreasing relative risk aversion implies a decreasing absolute risk aversion, but not vice-versa, i.e., for a BUF, u,
It can be checked that for this function, when β ≥ 0 and q < 1 and q = 0, r A (u, x) is a decreasing function of x for x > 0. However, r R (u, x) = x(x + b −1 [(x + b) q + 1 − q]) is strictly increasing if 0 < q < 1; strictly decreasing if q < 0 and β = 0 and neither if q < 0 and β > 0.
Appendix *
Reading of results listed here is strictly optional.
Risk Premium: Additional Properties
Replacex withx + µ andz withz − µ in (2) to get (u(x + µ +z − µ))dF (z) = u x + µ + (z − µ)dF (z) − ρ(x + µ,z − µ) . Now, comparing it (2) we can see that ρ(x,z) = ρ(x + µ,z − µ). That is, we can analysis any given riskz by studying the riskz − µ. WLOG, we can assume that zdF (z) = µ = 0, i.e., we can assume that the risk is actuarially neutral or fair. In the following, we will make this assumption. Therefore, the above equality can be written as (u(x +z))dF (z) = u x + zdF (z) − ρ(x,z) = u(x − ρ(x,z)).
Let u −1 1 (x) = t(x), i.e., x = u 1 (t(x)). Since u 1 (.), is increasing, t(.) is increasing as well. Therefore, u 2 • u , i.e., u 2 (t(x)) u 1 (t(x)) is decreasing. But, u 2 (t(x)) u 1 (t(x)) is decreasing iff log u 2 (t(x)) u 1 (t(x)) is decreasing, i.e., d dx ( u 2 (t(x)) u 1 (t(x)) ) ≤ 0 ⇔ d dx log u 2 (t(x)) u 1 (t(x)) ≤ 0, which is true in view of (10).
(iv) ⇒ (vi): Take any x and F (.). Let u 1 (c(F, u 1 , x)) = u 1 (x+z)dF (z) and u 2 (c(F, u 2 , x)) = u 2 (x+z)dF (z). Take anyx such that u 2 (x+z)dF (z) ≥ u 2 (x). Clearly, u 2 (c(F, u 2 ,x)) ≥ u 2 (x) ⇒ c(F, u 2 ,x) ≥x. Now c(F, u 1 ) ≥ c(F, u 2 ) ⇒ c(F, u 1 ) ≥x, i.e., u 1 (c(F, u 1 , x)) ≥ u 1 (x), i.e., u 1 (x + z)dF (z) ≥ u 1 (x).
(iii) ⇒ (iv): From equation (??), u i (x − ρ i (x,z)) = u i (x +z)dF (z), i = 1, 2, i.e., x − ρ i (x,z) = (u i ) −1 ( u i (x +z)dF (z)),
−1 ( u i (x +z)dF (z)), i = 1, 2. Therefore, ρ 2 (x,z) − ρ 1 (x,z) = (u 1 ) −1 ( u 1 (x +z)dF (z)) − (u 2 ) −1 ( u 2 (x +z)dF (z)).
Let,t = u 1 (x +z), i.e.,x +z = u −1 1 (t), then the above equation can be written as ρ 1 (x,z) − ρ 2 (x,z) = (u 1 ) −1 ( t dF (z)) − (u 2 ) −1 u 2 ((u 1 ) −1 (t))dF (z).
Now, consider the RHS of (12). Since, u 2 • (u 1 ) −1 is concave, from Jensen's inequality u 2 • (u 1 ) −1 (t)dF (z) ≤ u 2 • (u 1 ) −1 (t)dF (z), i.e., (t)dF (z) = 0.
That is ρ 2 (x,z) ≥ ρ 1 (x,z), i.e., zdF (z) − ρ 2 (x,z) ≤ zdF (z) − ρ 1 (x,z), i.e., c(F, u 2 , x) ≤ c(F, u 1 , x).
Proof of Proposition 6: The above claim follows immediately from the arguments given in the proof of Proposition 5. (i) is straightforward. Note that from Proposition 5, when u 2 (z) is more concave than u 1 (z) than ρ 2 (x,z) ≥ ρ 1 (x,z), i.e., ρ(x,z) is decreasing function of x.
